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4Introduction
While conducting this essay, the following commonly accepted scientific facts1 were taken
into account:
?  the notion of corruption, what it means to the public and how it is embedded in society
keeps changing as time passes within a particular culture, and naturally these changes
are followed by changes in the legal system, namely within the field of terminology,
judicial practice, sanctions and terms and their reasons adduced,
?  corruption, as the negative segment of social, economic, and political life, has existed
since time immemorial as an integral part of various cultures and constitutional forms,
?  corruption is not an exclusively Hungarian phenomenon,
?  in the world of globalization, corruption knows no borders, it has assumed
international dimensions and presumes international relations,
?  the efficiency of anti-corruption campaigns is usually rather poor, and it is only
international cooperation - which is becoming a common practice today - that has any
potential for bringing about a positive change,
?  working out the details of fighting corruption in Hungary is still ahead of us, it is
jurisdiction that is at the most advanced stage at the moment.
1. Nature and development rules of corruption in general
One of my favourite example to illustrate the essence of corruption is the "golden apple case"
taken from Greek mythology. The example shows the role of several active bribing parties
linked to the passive offender. Agreeing with one of the well-known Hungarian author2 of
corruption categories, corruption can only appear where there is tension and contradiction in
any of the social and economic conditions. Corruption is intended to recreate the correct
balance in its rather peculiar form … with more or less success.
Several distinctions have to be made for defining corruption. First we have to make a
distinction between the different forms of appearance of corruption - that is
?  the general,
?  the special and
?  the unique level.
In general level of the form of appearance: corruption is a permanently changing social
phenomenon, a historical-social product/category in terms of socio-economic environment, of
its characteristic relationships, its time-horizon defined by the rate and speed of changes.
Similarly to criminology corruption is a mirror of the society’s basic inconsistencies actively
deforming it using the lack of social-economic integrity system. I would say, each country has
her corruption which one she has deserved.
The corruption as a mass-phenomenon has all those characteristics the social mass-
phenomena have, effecting at the same time mainly in the distribution system of the society
by forming-deforming it. So the basic criterion of corruption is its secondary distribution
character preventing the planed distribution of goods in terms of
                                               
1 Dr. Iván Münnich: Corruption research, National Institution of Criminology, Budapest, 2000
2 Dr. Mariann Kránitz: Corruption (In: Criminological Issues, Crime, Crime-control. Ed.: K. Gönczöl – L.
Korinek – M. Lévay), Corvina, Budapest, 1996
5?  size,
?  method or the
?  circle of preferred.
Another important criterion of corruption is its similar role in distribution-redistribution of
the non-material system. It does mean that the corruption on one hand is realized mainly in
economic relations but it is effecting at the same time the restructuring of social relations in
different fields: moral-ethics, culture, science, ideology, policy family etc both on macro and
micro level.
In special (individual) level the characteristics of basic corruption situation are the
following:
?  an interpersonal relationship of minimum two persons,
?  there is a (changing) subordination of one of the parties in the given situation,
?  an effective cooperation of the parties has to be supposed by special rules and
?  a tie of conspiracies is to prevent the relationship to reveal it and maximizing the
mutual advantages of the parties.
Social harm of the before described phenomenon is in potential widening and deepening of
the successful system of connection with changing roles of the parties.
The unique level of corruption – among mass and individual ones – is characterized by the
circle of the subjects in a special position to be corrupted and bridging the previous levels.
This positions you can find first of all in the following fields: judgment, punishing
institutions, police, political institutions but also in sport etc.
Immanent development rules of corruption are :
?  chain-reaction in spreading,
?  widening reproduction,
?  ability of flexible adaptation and
?  high latencies.
Distinction has to be made also between corruption as a general social phenomenon and as a
penal law phenomenon.
Relating to the former analysis of general and individual level of appearance forms,
corruption is mass-phenomenon and social relation. Demonstrating the key morphological
characteristics of corruption crimes we are witnessing that ever since the early phases of the
development of law certain states have regarded corruption a penal law phenomenon and from
time to time they have sanctioned particular aspects of corruption, but never the whole of it.
It seems to be a historical legislation rule that only parts of corruption are emphasized
and made a target of penal law of the time. These segments are at times small and at times
large, but no matter how small it is at times, its significance can never be overlooked. It
means that the mentioned aspects of corruption have already surpassed the limit beyond
which something is considered a threat to society, as determined by the penal law of the time.
Relating to the penal law: as a case of corruption, the following offences are listed as a
crime against the clean morals of public life: bribery of officials, economic bribery, fraudulent
misuse of funds, influence peddling.
6On the basis of the Hungarian figures we should note that examining statistical data relating to
corruption crime is not really of informative character because of the very small number of
the sample (about 800 revealed cases/year in the ‘90s as an average).
In the last 40 years (1960-2000) the dynamics of statistical data relating to corruption crime is
rather tragicomic character and far from the realities of life in Hungary. Share of revealed
corruption crimes in all revealed crimes has remained below 1%! Furthermore since 1980 –
from when the total sum of crimes has started to grow permanently and has reached a sum of
almost 3,5-4 times of the former period – the share of corruption crime has been slightly
decreased.
In order to understand the before mentioned data we should reveal the roots and main trends
of corruption in the second half of the 20th century Hungary.
2. Roots and main trends of corruption in Hungary in the second
half of the 20th century, in the party-state and after the change in
political regime
Examining the reasons and consequences of the appearance of forms of domestic corruption it
can be stated that the higher level of civilization, the development of the economy, and the
development of more and more complicated social structures do not impede or possibly
reduce corruption, but on the contrary they encourage its growth and the appearance of newer
and newer forms and mutations.
Rather frequent and great socio-economic and ideological changes in the history of a country
will also not help the moral approach in opinions and sentences of the society relating to
corruption. Furthermore the lack of democracy and its institution is also not a definite help to
force the public opinion in increasing the relevant moral standards.
2.1 Main reasons generating corruption forms in the socialist system in
Hungary
Inherited traditions and patterns of behaviour
It is well-known that the Hungarian society had a very limited time for learning special rules
from feudalism to socialism. The ruling elite could not forget the advantages of nepotism and
thanking to the economic and political results of the World Wars I and II – all together in
more or less 20 years of peace – the corrupt actions has been time to time sanctioned and
tolerate, more over helped in enlargement by incorrect decisions.
The new challenges relating to the changes of regime into the soviet-oriented power
communist-type regime strengthen the so called “contact-capital system” in all terms: at the
newly emerging class and in the deteriorated/devaluated position of the former elite.
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The nature of shortage economy by the help of its rigid contemplation of economic plans
necessarily corrupted millions of people trying to establish their every day life. The decision-
maker persons in position of sellers, producers, entrepreneurs, traders, service people etc.
could live on tipping, gratuities, favouritism and there was a wide range of benefits granted
them for their “services”.
An average Hungarian citizen had to maintain a well developed chain of regular tipping,
gratuity, connections to meet the those potential sources which could help him/her to
guarantee the basic needs of the family.
Process in which the private functions became public services
As a result of the rigid centralization in numerous segments of the life the private functions
became public services. This process have reached services as a whole, infrastructures and
also the culture, education and health service.
I would say the necessity of corrupt actions were centrally established in the every day life of
the society in order to make the system operate. From hairdressers to physicians the public
service character of their activity through nationalization of the whole economy has formed a
special interest enforcing mechanism on the buyers’ side manifested as tipping, gratuity etc.
The lack of a market economy and the officially low salaries in the service sector (calculating
with tipping and gratuity) established a long time effecting corruption process.
Corrupt behaviour of the ruling elite
There was a fundamental characteristic of selecting leaders in every area of life dominated by
politically motivated selection (so-called contra-selection preferring political obligation
against professional competence). On the basis of the previous method of selection the system
of mutual indebtedness easily came into being. This white collar corruption mechanism had a
practice of really “artistic character”.
The primary venue of this was the bargaining mechanism operating at various levels of the
state and party governance, in institutional and informal ways.
This means of enforcement of interests adjusted to the bargaining mechanism (personal
acquaintance, hunting parties, the granting of mutual favours etc.) were regarded as inherent
elements of the system and, with the exception of a few flagrant cases, they were tacitly
accepted. The phenomena of corruption and the combating thereof came into the focus of the
“official attention” only in the other spheres of the social and economic life, primarily in the
areas relating to the lifestyles of the citizens and to the satisfaction of their day-to-day needs.
The investigation and sanctioning acts of corruption – well known for being restricted anyway
– were also often hindered by party political consideration.
8Paternalistic character of state
The essence of paternalistic state in terms of corruption we can derivate from total
centralization, over-dimension of state administration’ functions, unification and/or confusion
of different state functions such as proprietor and public power.
Among all causes of corruption the deficiencies of the operation of the state governing
organizations has been the dominant factor. The lack of legal regulation, the bureaucratic
proceedings, poor controls and a low-level financial and moral rewarding of staff further
aggravated the problems arising from the economy of shortage.
There was a “Janus face” of the paternalistic state generating antagonistic conflicts of interests
through its bureaucratic proceedings on one hand and declaring slogans of anticorruption
measures on the other.
From the end of the eighties on we can observe the changes of corruption appearing or
multiplying in the transition period starting with the change of regime.
2.2 Characteristics of corruption in Hungary during the transitional period
of building a market economy
As it was emphasized before, fundamental socio-economic and ideological changes of the
regime are not helping the countries in effective combating against corruption. Furthermore
the phenomenon itself also has been changed in the transition countries in its quality and
widening appearance.
Since 1990 the Hungarian society has been living in an age of rapid social and economic
changes, implementing a transition
?  from the single party system into a multi-party one,
?  from the party rule to the rule of law,
?  from centrally planned economy to a market economy and
?  a radical transformation of the economic and ownership structure.
The partial “dismantling” and reorganization of the previous state apparatus and development
of a democratic institution system fundamentally was operating against corruption, despite
interim uncertainties.
The main “genetic junctions” of corruption were/are as to be followed.
Inherited traditions and patterns of behaviour
There is a continues existence of old types of corrupt behaviour after the disappearance of the
phenomena of conditions existing in and produced by socialism.
It can be explained by inherited conscious paradigms of the people and also of institution
system (operated by them). Patterns of behaviour of the newly established and/or reorganized
institutions have a similar long lasting characteristics of change in the conscious development
as described before.
9There is a special uncertainty of the population based on the former lack of a market economy
and officially low salaries in the service sector (calculating with tipping and gratuity) up to the
present time. Therefore obligation of tipping in case of given services (hairdresser, taxi-
driver) and gratuity to physicians are not clean phenomena in the developing Hungarian
market economy up to now.
Period of transformation
It is also well known that great changes in socio-economic systems (wars, revolutions with or
without blood) are both strengthen and fasten the potential harm of corruption because of the
following:
?  introduction of new corruption targets in connection of keeping, gaining or regaining
the power,
?  possibility of “fishing in troubled water” in a partial legal and economic public order
and
?  other important preferences of rule making in the early stage of transformation.
Owing to the urgency of the tasks, new laws and other types of statutes have been almost
mass produced in the early nineties, coming out in a rapid flow, containing innumerable
loopholes, internal contradictions.
Naturally all these circumstances, practically unavoidable deficiencies and disharmonies, the
uncertainties of the state organs – partly related to the quality of legislation – have opened up
a wide area for the obtaining of illegal advantages and incomes also in Hungary with the help
of targeted corruption.
Privatisation – establishing an emerging new segment of the owners
However the first phase of the privatisation of the state property (in the so-called spontaneous
privatisation phase from 1989 to 1991) was launched without a concept clarifying the
fundamental questions and the necessary institutional and regulation conditions the Hungarian
privatisation was more or less controlled.
There were some specialties in the Hungarian privatisation of the state property compared to
the majority of the transitional countries of the CEE:
?  It was the operating enterprise the subject to be privatised and in order of further
operation the new owner had an obligation to bye as a minimum rate 50%+1 vote of
the property. This method of privatisation was fundamentally different from the
practice of the other CEE countries where the forms of voucher or MRP mass-
privatisation have taken priorities. In the Hungarian model of privatisation the new
owner also inherited all former obligations (debts, guarantees) and competences
(licenses, agreements) of the property bought.
?  In most cases the new owners were outsider investors not belonging to the
management of the companies. Therefore it was a quite common method of the
outsider investors to give different benefits for the former management in the
privatisation process in order to take them to their side. This special transfer of
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incomes after all have decreased the whole state income originated from the
privatisation.
?  There was also more or less common the obligatory competition in course of
privatising enterprises, real-estates, rights relating to properties etc. It is true that not in
all but in most of the cases there were the prices the decisive elements in the
privatisation of the state property in Hungary.
?  The Hungarian privatisation was strongly centralized through the direction of
organization situated in the capital and the income of the privatisation came
directly/indirectly into the central budget.
What could be the main findings of both the above mentioned special conditions relating to
corruption and the entire privatisation process:
?  In the first phase of the privatisation process (first of all in the phase of the
spontaneous privatisation) the rule of law was quite poor.
?  There were also some loopholes in operation of the State Property Agency (SPA) in
terms of the transparency and accountability of the competition.
?  In the tendering system (in the process of bidding, evaluation and granting) there was
an overruling effect in order to excluding and/or minimizing the subjective elements in
course of the process. Naturally the most complete scoring itself could not exclude the
subjective elements.
?  It could be stated that decision makers (above all in the early and mid-nineties) of the
privatisation process at the SPA personally could not get rid off the some conflicts of
interests (both relating to the shortage of professionals and that of the confidence).
?  Relating to the statements of different reports of the State Audit Office (SAO) one of
the main problems of the privatisation process from 1989 to the mid-nineties could be
summarized as the lack of the regular and efficient external professional controls and a
poor efficiency of the built-in internal controls
Effects of the international corruption
One of the greatest challenges of the last decades of the twenties century was the fact that
corruption crossed the national borders and became a world phenomenon. Its close contacts
with the organized crime have created the corruption to become an effective weapon. Relating
to the practice of organized crime, in order to meet their interests, it is ready to kill or propose
different deals of corruption. The latter solution seems to be more efficient and appropriate to
reach the goal.
Effects of international corruption we could witness through some single actions in case of
trading with some so-called ABC or fiscal products (alcohol, oil, café etc.), in the phase of the
spontaneous privatisation and in course of the state consolidation of banks.
Relating to the information of media the multinational corruption had also effect on the
privatisation process and in course of the foreign direct investments in Hungary. Naturally
this “imported approach” could only develop on the basis of existing willingness at the
Hungarian partners. Therefore some modifications in the Penal Code were already made and
new laws (e.g. to prevent money laundering the Law XXIV. in 1994) were introduced in the
first half of the nineties.
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 The methods of the large foreign companies in case of public procurement are usually more
sophisticated. They invite the decision-makers to conferences and shows abroad, to factory
and reference visits. Since the usefulness of these may even be justified partially, one’s bad
conscience may be kept asleep. In some instances, we have the case or suspicion of targeted
tenders. This happens when the tender document sets a condition which only a single
company, a single bidder satisfies (characteristic for some products of information and
communication technology).
Public procurement and corruption3
 Public procurement is one of the activities which entail the greatest temptation of corruption.
The reason for this being that in the course of public procurement often rather large amounts
are being spent, while those who make the decisions are not spending their own money. The
public procurement processes are rather complicated, and there are therefore various ways to
manipulate them. There are a number of ways to corrupt the public procurement process in
the various stages of the procedure. These include the manipulation of the conditions and
information in a way which favours certain suppliers, e.g. issue of orders without inviting
bids, etc.
 
?  One of the simplest solutions is if the supplier intended to be favoured is furnished
with information which the competitors have no access to. It also often happens that
the compilation of the conditions is already based on the conditions defined by a
particular supplier which constitute the basic consideration for assessment, and the
others are thereby excluded from the competition.
?  There is also plenty of scope for manipulation in the course of the assessment of the
bids. This results in an invitation to tender which does not define the considerations
for assessment clearly, and thereby allows scope for subjective decisions.
?  In the implementation phase, the procedural rules set almost no limit to corrupt
manipulation. The customer has the possibility not to require compliance with the
conditions stipulated in the contract, and to seek various benefits in exchange for this.
 
 Corruption may take many different forms. These include the granting of various gifts
(valuable objects, holidays abroad, etc.). It is a less obvious but efficient method of corruption
if an officer in charge of public procurement, who makes the decisions, is employed after his
or her retirement by the company which he or she was in contact with within the framework
of public procurement. It is obviously impossible to completely avoid the acceptance of gifts,
and nor is it absolutely necessary. The granting of gifts does not necessarily constitute
corruption since it may also be a mere manifestation of courtesy. It is therefore a frequently
used method that the values, in excess of which the acceptance of a gift must be reported, is
determined in cash for the employees working in the different areas.
 
                                               
3 Based on the chapter:Nature of corruption in the public procurement (In: Accessibility and Transparency of the
Public Procurement Process in Hungary, Albania and the Slovak Republic. Foundation for Market Economy -
Albanian Center for Economic Research - Center for Economic Development, Budapest - Tirana – Bratislava,
1998 )
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 Practically everyone agrees that since the coming into force of the Public Procurement Act,
(January 1, 1996) there have been fewer transactions suspicious of corruption in Hungary.
However, government and independent experts continue to find public procurement the most
dangerous area of state administration from the respect of corruption4. (According to a 1997
investigation of the State Audit Office, a considerable part of the public procurement
procedures were irregular.)
 
 Local governments are the main customers of the public procurement market since so far
more than 40% of the parties inviting tenders have been municipalities or their institutions.
Their share in the amounts spent is also similar. Their most characteristic, prominent activities
are construction, renovation and project works, and one third of the tenders invited by them
relate to these areas.
 
 In the opinion of the Council for Public Procurement (in 1997), in particular municipalities
have abused the opportunity, offered by the Act, of conducting negotiation-based procedures
instead of public procedures5. In the course of the construction works of large values, which
take a longer period of time, there is plenty of room for bribing. The shadow of suspicion was
often cast on health care projects which accounted for almost one half of the total
municipality projects. The observance of the rules by the responsible institutions and their
managers is questioned by the fact that various professional and other interest representations
have attempted to prove on several occasions since the passage of the Public Procurement Act
that the rules of public procurement were not applicable to health care.
 
Development of the Hungarian public procurement in order to narrow the path of possible
corruption efforts will be the case of the next phase of our research activity.
                                               
 4 Sources: Public procurement: where the state and private sectors come to do business. (Chapter title in the
Manual of the international anti-corruption organization, Transparency International. Edited by Jeremy Pope,
Berlin, 1996).
 5Sources: the articles written by Katalin Bossányi in the daily Népszabadság: Corruption is also present in public
procurement (August 12, 1997), The financial management of municipalities is, in fact, not controlled by
anybody (November 4, 1997), and Open tenders are not popular (November 18, 1997).
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